6.1 Introduction
The phenomenon of government shutdowns is unique to the United States. Most advanced democracies experience political stalemates and budgetary crises, but not administrative stoppages. The reasons are rooted in constitutional design, legislative procedure, and political culture. Understanding these structural differences clarifies why the United States remains vulnerable to periodic shutdowns while nations such as the United Kingdom, Canada, or Australia do not.
6.2 The constitutional design of separation and stalemate
The U.S. Constitution establishes a separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches:
- Congress holds the “power of the purse” (Article I, Section 9).
- The President executes the laws but cannot spend without congressional appropriation.
- Each branch has a veto—Congress through its control of appropriations, and the President through the power to reject bills.
Because neither branch automatically dissolves or resigns when a budget fails, the result is a governing impasse rather than a change of government. Thus, a funding lapse triggers a shutdown under the Antideficiency Act, rather than an election or transfer of power (CRS 2025; Peterson Foundation 2024).
6.3 The Antideficiency Act and its binding effect
The Antideficiency Act (ADA) enforces fiscal discipline by criminalising spending without congressional authorisation. Once the Attorney General’s Civiletti opinions (1980–81) declared that agencies must cease operations during a funding lapse, shutdowns became a legal necessity, not a choice. As the GAO (2023) summarises:
“A lapse in appropriations obligates agencies to suspend non-excepted activities. Continuing operations without funding would violate 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341–1342.”
This rigid legal interpretation distinguishes the United States from systems that permit temporary expenditure under executive warrant or reserve authority.
6.4 Multiplicity of veto points in the U.S. system
The American legislative process contains numerous veto points that make compromise difficult:
- Two chambers of Congress must each pass identical versions of 12 separate appropriations bills.
- The President may veto any bill, requiring a two-thirds majority to override.
- The Senate filibuster means 60 votes are often required to advance legislation.
- Ideological caucuses within parties (e.g., Freedom Caucus) can block compromise from within the majority.
Political scientists (Tsebelis 2002; Mann & Ornstein 2016) have long noted that such institutional veto multiplicity increases the likelihood of deadlock, particularly under polarisation.
6.5 The role of polarisation and party strategy
Since the 1990s, American politics has become increasingly polarised. Government shutdowns have shifted from accidental lapses to strategic weapons in partisan conflict.
- The 1995–96 shutdown sought to pressure President Clinton over deficit reduction.
- The 2013 shutdown was leveraged by congressional Republicans seeking to delay the Affordable Care Act.
- The 2018–19 and 2025 shutdowns involved disputes over border security and healthcare subsidies respectively.
In each case, shutdowns became a negotiating tactic—an attempt to use the threat of public disruption to extract policy concessions. However, polling repeatedly shows such tactics usually damage public trust in both parties (Pew Research Center 2019).
6.6 The parliamentary contrast
In Westminster-style parliamentary systems, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, or Australia:
- Failure to pass a budget (called “loss of supply”) is treated as a vote of no confidence.
- The government either resigns or triggers an election; civil service operations continue under established caretaker conventions.
- Expenditure continues through permanent appropriations or statutory authorisations until a new government forms (BBC 2023; Australian Department of Finance 2022).
Thus, there is political collapse but administrative continuity—the opposite of the U.S. case, where political continuity coexists with administrative stoppage.
6.7 Belgium, Germany, and the EU comparison
Even countries with fragmented coalitions rarely experience true shutdowns.
- Belgium (2010–11): no formal government for 589 days, yet civil servants continued under caretaker budgets authorised by Parliament (The Economist 2011).
- Germany: the Basic Law requires that budget appropriations continue at previous-year levels until new ones are passed (Article 111).
- European Union: the Financial Regulation (EU) 2018/1046 provides for “provisional twelfths”, allowing one-twelfth of the previous budget per month during a delay.
In short, other democracies build automatic continuity into law to prevent shutdowns.
6.8 Cultural and ideological elements
The American political culture prizes limited government and institutional confrontation. Government shutdowns, though unpopular, fit within a constitutional narrative of checking power through fiscal control. In contrast, parliamentary democracies view state continuity as a non-negotiable public good, not a bargaining chip.
6.9 Analytical summary
| Dimension | United States | United Kingdom / Canada / Australia |
|---|---|---|
| System type | Presidential, separation of powers | Parliamentary, fusion of powers |
| Appropriation lapse outcome | Shutdown of non-excepted services | Loss of confidence → election, services continue |
| Legal basis | Antideficiency Act | Caretaker conventions; permanent appropriations |
| Fiscal continuity mechanism | None (requires CR or new law) | Automatic or ministerial authority |
| Political resolution | Negotiation, legislation, or executive veto override | Electoral turnover or coalition realignment |
The U.S. shutdown, therefore, is a structural product of its constitutional architecture and legal framework, reinforced by partisanship and procedural veto points.
References (Harvard style)
Australian Department of Finance (2022) Caretaker Conventions and Financial Continuity in the Commonwealth. Canberra: Government of Australia.
BBC (2023) ‘What Happens if the UK Budget Fails to Pass?’ London: British Broadcasting Corporation.
Congressional Research Service (2025) Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects. Washington, DC: Library of Congress.
Government Accountability Office (2023) Antideficiency Act: A Primer on the Legal Framework. Washington, DC: GAO.
Mann, T. E. and Ornstein, N. J. (2016) It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism. New York: Basic Books.
Peterson Foundation (2024) ‘A Brief History of U.S. Government Shutdowns—and Why Other Countries Do Not Have Them’. Available at: https://www.pgpf.org/article/a-brief-history-of-us-government-shutdowns-and-why-other-countries-do-not-have-them/ (Accessed 9 Nov 2025).
The Economist (2011) ‘Belgium’s 589 Days Without a Government: Still Standing’. The Economist, 17 December.
Tsebelis, G. (2002) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.