Journal entry, 19 January 2026 (London)
Switzerland’s role in the Greenland dispute is best understood as a case of “political signalling under legal restraint”. It is neither a NATO ally nor an EU member, so it cannot easily participate in the alliance choreography now visible around Greenland. Yet it remains deeply invested in a predictable European security and trade environment—and in the credibility of international-law principles that protect small and medium states from coercion.
1) What Swiss “neutrality” permits—and what it discourages
Switzerland’s own foreign-policy doctrine treats permanent neutrality as an instrument for independence and territorial inviolability, rooted in the law of neutrality (i.e., non-participation in wars between states). (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs) That legal posture does not forbid Switzerland from holding political views; it tends, however, to discourage military posturing and encourages careful calibration when great-power disputes spill across Europe.
This helps explain the Swiss pattern in January: avoid military entanglement, but defend process norms.
2) The Swiss executive line: any change requires Danish and Greenlandic consent
According to Reuters reporting (reprinted in other outlets), Switzerland’s foreign ministry stated that any change to Greenland’s status requires the consent of Denmark and Greenland. (POLITIKO – News Philippine Politics)
That is an important form of alignment: Switzerland is not joining a NATO exercise or an EU statement, but it is placing itself firmly inside the consent/self-determination frame—the opposite of a coercive acquisition narrative.
3) Parliament breaks the “deafening silence”: the Swiss–Greenland friendship group
Where Switzerland becomes especially revealing is in the internal critique of cautious neutrality. Swiss lawmakers created a Swiss–Greenland parliamentary friendship group in mid-January, explicitly framed as a response to Trump’s repeated demands and threats. SWI swissinfo.ch reports that the group’s co-chairs are Laurent Wehrli (FDP/The Liberals), Elisabeth Schneider-Schneiter (The Centre) and Fabian Molina (Social Democrats), and that Molina argued the initiative was meant to break what he called the Federal Council’s “deafening silence”. (SWI swissinfo.ch)
The same report notes a planned parliamentary trip to Greenland to assess the situation directly—symbolic, but politically pointed. (SWI swissinfo.ch)
4) The domestic fault line: neutrality politics at home
The friendship group also exposed a familiar Swiss split. The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) declined to participate and warned such gestures can be misunderstood internationally, which aligns with its broader tendency to defend a stricter reading of neutrality and minimise foreign-policy activism. (SWI swissinfo.ch)
This maps onto the wider Swiss debate over how neutrality should be interpreted in a sanctions-and-coercion era—where political measures may be lawful, but politically contested. (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs)
5) Why Switzerland matters in this crisis
Switzerland’s behaviour clarifies an often-missed distinction:
- Neutrality is not equivalence.
Switzerland is not treating the US and Denmark as morally or legally interchangeable. It is insisting that Greenland’s status can only change through consent (Denmark + Greenland), while keeping its state posture cautious. (POLITIKO – News Philippine Politics) - Non-alignment does not mean non-interest.
Swiss political and media discourse is already asking whether tariff coercion—once normalised—could later affect open, surplus-running economies like Switzerland. Even Swiss coverage that stresses low involvement points to growing parliamentary pressure for Bern to coordinate more closely with EU partners against “attacks on multilateralism”. (SWI swissinfo.ch)
In short, Switzerland exemplifies “procedural alignment without alliance membership”: it cannot play NATO’s military hand, but it can (and did) reinforce the legal principle that defeats the acquisition claim—no consent, no change.
References
EDA (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs) (n.d.) Neutrality. Available via FDFA/EDA website. (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs)
EDA (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs) (2022) Questions and answers on Switzerland’s neutrality. Available via FDFA/EDA website. (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs)
Reuters (2026) ‘Switzerland says any change to Greenland’s status requires consent of Denmark and Greenland’, 7 January (reprinted). (POLITIKO – News Philippine Politics)
SWI swissinfo.ch / RTS (2026) ‘Swiss lawmakers form Swiss-Greenland friendship group’, 12 January. (SWI swissinfo.ch)
SWI swissinfo.ch (2026) ‘Switzerland Today’ (Greenland/tariff discussion excerpt), mid-January. (SWI swissinfo.ch)