Journal entry, 19 January 2026 (London)
Poland’s approach (Episode 9) was normatively loud but operationally restrained. The posture of Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia is different: a form of procedural hedging—avoiding public confrontation with Washington, keeping channels open, and (in Hungary’s case) signalling that the EU should not speak with one voice on Greenland.
Euronews captured the essence: leaders with ties to Trump have “yet to push back hard” and—because EU foreign-policy positions typically require unanimity—this restraint can inhibit a unified European response ahead of emergency summit diplomacy. (euronews)
1) Hungary: “Not an EU issue” — and a refusal to endorse a joint line
Hungary is the clearest case where “neutrality” shades into active non-cooperation. Reuters reports Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó stating that Greenland’s future is “not a European Union issue” and indicating Hungary would not support a joint EU statement—framing the matter as bilateral, resolvable through talks between the parties. (Longbridge SG)
In practical terms, this is not endorsement of US acquisition; it is a jurisdictional veto: if Greenland is treated as outside EU competence, Brussels loses a platform for collective messaging, even before it reaches the stage of trade countermeasures.
2) Czechia: “Dialogue, not declarations” — alliance-management over public positioning
Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš’ language has been consistently de-escalatory. Euronews reports him writing that Greenland is a Danish autonomous territory “without doubt”, but insisting that the Czech government would “support dialogue, not declarations”—adding that foreign policy is “about diplomacy” rather than performative statements. (euronews)
Reuters reporting on Czech domestic politics also notes that, when pressed by opposition to join European backing for Greenland, Babiš’ government maintained that dialogue is needed. (Reuters)
Again, the pattern is not “pro-US”; it is anti-escalation by communication discipline.
3) Slovakia: sovereignty affirmed through international-law symmetry, not anti-US rhetoric
Slovakia is often grouped with the “tread carefully” cohort, but its official line is more legally explicit than Hungary’s or Czechia’s. In a ministerial statement on the new US tariffs, Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár stated that—applying the same rules and principles of international law—Slovakia considers Greenland to be part of Denmark, explicitly pairing this with the claim that Crimea is part of Ukraine. (mzv.sk)
The framing matters. Rather than confronting Washington directly, Slovakia anchors its position in consistency of legal principle and a preference for diplomacy and calm—supporting Denmark’s territorial integrity while avoiding the sharpest language of European condemnation.
4) Why their posture matters: EU unity can be diluted by design
This trio’s significance is institutional. Under Article 31 TEU, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) decisions are taken unanimously (with limited exceptions). (Legislation.gov.uk) The Council’s own guidance similarly notes that unanimity applies in sensitive areas such as CFSP. (Council of the European Union)
That creates leverage for “procedural hedgers”: they can slow, soften, or complicate a joint EU political stance, even if they are not openly siding with Washington. Euronews explicitly warned that the trio could obstruct EU unity as leaders prepared for emergency coordination. (euronews)
What this episode establishes
Hungary, Slovakia and Czechia illustrate a core dynamic of the crisis: silence (or procedural narrowing) can function as a strategic choice. It is not the same as supporting US acquisition. Instead, it is a hedge shaped by (i) reliance on US security ties, (ii) domestic political incentives, and (iii) EU decision-rules that give disproportionate impact to withholding consent.
- Hungary: reclassifies Greenland as non-EU business and rejects a joint EU line. (Longbridge SG)
- Czechia: affirms Danish autonomy, prioritises diplomacy over declarations. (euronews)
- Slovakia: affirms Danish sovereignty in international-law terms, but avoids escalation framing. (mzv.sk)
In short, the “quiet trio” are not pro-US Greenland advocates; they are risk minimisers—and in an EU that often needs unanimity for foreign-policy clarity, risk minimisers can become de facto agenda-shapers. (Legislation.gov.uk)
References
Euronews (2026) ‘Europe’s pro-Trump leaders tread carefully as Greenland crisis grows’, 19 January. (euronews)
Euronews (2026) ‘Europe wants to “avoid escalation” with US over Greenland: what comes next’, 19 January. (euronews)
European Union (2010) Treaty on European Union, Article 31 (CFSP decision-making). (Legislation.gov.uk)
Reuters (2026) ‘Hungary’s foreign minister says Greenland is “not an EU issue”’, 19 January. (Longbridge SG)
Reuters (2026) ‘Czech PM Babiš’ government wins confidence vote…’, 15 January (Greenland passage). (Reuters)
Slovak Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (2026) ‘Statement by Minister J. Blanár on the new U.S. tariffs’, 18–19 January. (mzv.sk)
Council of the European Union (n.d.) ‘Unanimity (voting system)’. (Council of the European Union)