Journal entry, 19 January 2026 (London)
If Episode 1 established why Greenland matters strategically, today’s reading clarified something more basic: much of the political theatre rests on public confusion between sovereignty, autonomy, and self-determination. Those terms are routinely treated as interchangeable in media soundbites, yet Greenland’s constitutional position depends on their separation.
1) Sovereignty: where ultimate legal authority sits
Greenland is part of the Kingdom of Denmark. The House of Commons Library summarises the modern baseline succinctly: Greenland has been part of the Kingdom since 1953, gained home rule in 1979, and since 2009 has operated under a self-government arrangement for internal affairs—while remaining within the Kingdom. (House of Commons Library)
Denmark’s Prime Minister’s Office describes this as a constitutional structure constituted by the Danish Constitution plus the 2009 Self-Government Act, and notes that two members of the Folketing are elected in Greenland (under the Danish constitutional framework). (STM)
The practical implication is straightforward: arguments about “purchase” or “control” collide with an existing constitutional order in which Greenland is not an external possession governed by decree, but a self-governing polity inside a sovereign state.
2) Autonomy: what Greenland governs day-to-day
Autonomy in Greenland is not symbolic; it is structured. The Act on Greenland Self-Government (Act No. 473 of 12 June 2009) confirms that Greenland’s self-government authorities exercise legislative and executive power in the fields of responsibility they have taken over, with Greenland’s Parliament (Inatsisartut) and Government (Naalakkersuisut) at the centre of that authority. (STM)
The Prime Minister’s Office goes further by listing the kinds of new responsibilities Greenland may assume under the Act—ranging from elements of justice administration and policing to aviation, company law, financial regulation, and mineral resources—subject to the Act’s schedules and (for some areas) negotiation and preparation with Danish authorities. (STM)
The autonomy model is therefore best understood as transferable competences: Greenland can take over policy areas as constitutionally possible, and—crucially—assumes the financing responsibility for the areas it takes over. (STM)
3) What cannot be “taken over”: the non-transferable core
This is the point most relevant to the current crisis. Denmark’s Prime Minister’s Office states plainly that certain fields may not be transferred to Greenland under the arrangement: the Constitution, nationality, the Supreme Court, foreign/defence/security policy, and exchange-rate and monetary policy. (STM)
The House of Commons Library briefing aligns with this: Denmark retains responsibility for foreign affairs and defence, the Danish krone remains the currency, and the constitutional architecture remains anchored in the Kingdom. (House of Commons Library)
In effect, Greenland is deeply autonomous internally, but the “sovereign envelope”—especially foreign affairs and defence—remains with the Kingdom unless and until a lawful independence process is completed.
4) Self-determination: recognised in law, channelled through process
The most legally consequential sentence in the whole debate sits in the preamble to the 2009 Act: it recognises the people of Greenland as a people under international law with a right of self-determination, framing the arrangement as an agreement between Greenland and Denmark “as equal partners”. (STM)
Self-determination here is not rhetorical; it is procedural. The Act devotes a specific chapter to “Greenland’s access to independence” and states that the decision regarding independence “shall be taken by the people of Greenland,” after which negotiations must commence between the Danish Government and Naalakkersuisut. (STM)
Denmark’s Prime Minister’s Office then explains the constitutional steps required to translate that popular decision into statehood: negotiated terms must secure the consent of Greenland’s Parliament, be endorsed by a referendum in Greenland, and be concluded with the consent of the Folketing under the Danish Constitution—at which point Greenland would assume sovereignty over its territory. (STM)
This matters because it establishes what “legitimate change” looks like. Any pathway that attempts to substitute external pressure for Greenlandic consent is not merely diplomatically abrasive; it is constitutionally misaligned with the governing framework.
5) Foreign relations: more capacity than outsiders assume, but not a blank cheque
A final nuance is often missed: Greenland is not excluded from external relations. The Self-Government Act authorises Naalakkersuisut, on behalf of the Realm, to negotiate and conclude certain agreements under international law that exclusively concern Greenland and relate entirely to areas Greenland has taken over—while carving out defence and security policy and broader Kingdom-wide treaty activity for Danish handling under defined coordination rules. (STM)
Denmark’s Prime Minister’s Office reinforces this: the Danish Government and Folketing retain authority over foreign policy under the Constitution, but the Self-Government Act contains a detailed set of rules for Greenland’s involvement, consultation, and—where applicable—authorisation to conclude agreements relevant to its competences. (STM)
The constitutional picture is therefore neither “a colony” nor “an independent state”: it is a hybrid arrangement with deep internal autonomy, structured external participation, and a legally specified route to full sovereignty—if Greenland chooses it.
What this baseline does to the politics of “acquisition”
Once these categories are kept distinct, the present dispute becomes easier to interpret:
- Sovereignty sits with the Kingdom of Denmark unless a lawful independence route is chosen and completed. (STM)
- Autonomy means Greenland is not a passive object of policy; it governs large parts of its internal affairs and can assume additional fields. (STM)
- Self-determination means any fundamental change in status is anchored in a Greenlandic decision and negotiated constitutional process. (STM)
Which is why the most grounded European messaging keeps returning to a single principle: Greenland’s future is not a commodity to be traded under pressure; it is a constitutional and democratic choice to be made—first and foremost—by Greenlanders, within the Kingdom’s legal order.
References
Denmark (2009) Act No. 473 of 12 June 2009: Act on Greenland Self-Government (English translation). (STM)
House of Commons Library (2026) Curtis, J. and Fella, S., President Trump and Greenland: Frequently asked questions, Research Briefing CBP-10472, 21 January. (House of Commons Library)
House of Commons Library (2025) Fella, S., Greenland: Moves to independence and new international relations, Research Briefing CBP-10234, 3 April. (House of Commons Library)
Prime Minister’s Office (Denmark) (n.d.) Greenland (The Unity of the Realm: constitutional position and Self-Government framework). (STM)