Journal entry, 19 January 2026 (London)
Tonight, Greenland feels less like a remote Arctic territory and more like a stress point in the architecture of the post-1945 transatlantic order. The immediate dispute is framed as a negotiation over “control” and “purchase”. In practice, it has become a test of whether coercive economic leverage can be normalised inside an alliance that rests—at least rhetorically—on consent, sovereignty, and mutual defence. (Curtis and Fella, 2026). (House of Commons Library)
The idea did not begin in 2026
This is not the first time Donald Trump has pursued Greenland. In August 2019, he publicly acknowledged interest in purchasing Greenland, and then cancelled a planned Denmark visit after Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen stated Greenland was “not for sale”. Even then, the language was provocative, but the episode remained largely symbolic—an unusual diplomatic flare-up rather than a sustained campaign. (Curtis and Fella, 2026). (House of Commons Library)
What has changed is the persistence and the escalation. Following Trump’s re-election (late 2024), reporting summarised by the UK Parliament indicates a shift from occasional signalling to a more assertive posture: tariff threats were floated in early 2025, and the possibility of using force was not clearly ruled out in public messaging. By January 2026, the issue has returned not as a curiosity but as a live crisis condition for allies. (Curtis and Fella, 2026). (House of Commons Library)
Why Greenland matters strategically
The most persuasive explanation for the intensity is geography. Greenland sits on the shortest transatlantic routes between North America and Europe and is positioned at the centre of Arctic militarisation dynamics involving NATO, Russia, and (increasingly) China. Reuters notes that Greenland’s location makes it important for U.S. early-warning architectures—particularly as the shortest route from Europe to North America runs via Greenland. (Reuters, 2026b). (Reuters)
More concretely, the United States already maintains a permanent military presence at Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base). Reuters’ mapping and explanatory graphics describe the base’s early-warning radar and its role in missile warning and defence missions, positioned in front of North American early-warning systems that watch the Arctic corridor. (Reuters, 2025). (Reuters)
Independent reporting in 2026 similarly highlights Pituffik as the only remaining U.S. base in Greenland and describes its functions in missile warning/defence and space surveillance, underscoring why Washington can plausibly present Greenland as “national security” terrain rather than merely a real-estate acquisition. (ABC News Australia, 2026). (ABC)
Why it escalates into a transatlantic crisis
If Greenland were simply a bilateral U.S.–Denmark argument, it might be containable. The problem is that Denmark is a NATO ally; Greenland is a self-governing territory within the Kingdom of Denmark; and alliance commitments assume that disputes among members are not prosecuted through coercion. The UK Parliament briefing is explicit about the systemic risk: if the U.S. were to use force against Denmark to secure Greenland, the mutual defence foundation of NATO would be jeopardised. (Curtis and Fella, 2026). (House of Commons Library)
In other words, the Greenland question is not only what the U.S. wants, but how it is attempting to obtain it.
The “why now” of January 2026: coercion as method
The proximate escalation is the linkage of Greenland demands to tariff threats. Reuters reports that on 17 January 2026, Trump announced additional 10% import tariffs from 1 February on goods from Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Great Britain, increasing to 25% on 1 June and continuing until a deal was reached for the U.S. to purchase Greenland. (Reuters, 2026a). (Reuters)
This tactic matters as much as the underlying claim, because it changes the dispute from an argument about sovereignty into a contest over whether economic punishment is acceptable inside allied relations.
European states responded by asserting that their Greenland activity was part of allied security practice, not provocation. A joint statement by Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom declared “full solidarity” with Denmark and the people of Greenland, reaffirmed sovereignty and territorial integrity, and warned that tariff threats risk a “dangerous downward spiral” in transatlantic relations. (Government of Sweden, 2026). (Regeringskansliet)
A UK parliamentary briefing later framed this as allied cooperation around a pre-coordinated Danish exercise (“Arctic Endurance”) and noted that the UK’s involvement, for instance, was limited and described by the Ministry of Defence as not amounting to a “deployment”. (Curtis and Fella, 2026). (House of Commons Library)
What this prologue establishes
The crisis is best understood as three overlapping realities:
- A strategic geography problem (Arctic routes, early-warning architectures, and military posture). (Reuters, 2025; Reuters, 2026b). (Reuters)
- A constitutional sovereignty problem (Greenland’s status within the Kingdom of Denmark; the centrality of consent and self-determination). (Curtis and Fella, 2026). (House of Commons Library)
- A coercion-within-the-alliance problem (tariffs as leverage, and what that implies for NATO’s political credibility). (Reuters, 2026a; Government of Sweden, 2026). (Reuters)
That is why Greenland—despite its distance from most European capitals—has become a near-term measure of alliance cohesion. The story begins with a familiar Trump motif (a dramatic territorial bid) but quickly shifts into something more consequential: whether the transatlantic system still enforces its own norms when pressure comes from the inside.
References
ABC News Australia (2026) ‘What we know about the US and European military presence in Greenland’, 16 January. (ABC)
Curtis, J. and Fella, S. (2026) President Trump and Greenland: Frequently asked questions, House of Commons Library Research Briefing, 21 January. (House of Commons Library)
Government of Sweden (2026) ‘Statement by Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom’, 18 January. (Regeringskansliet)
Reuters (2025) ‘Trump’s push to acquire Greenland puts Arctic island in focus’ (graphics), 11 March. (Reuters)
Reuters (2026a) ‘Trump vows tariffs on eight European nations over Greenland’, 17 January. (Reuters)
Reuters (2026b) ‘Island of ice and contention: What Greenland looks like’ (photo essay), 21 January. (Reuters)