The Civic–Military Dictatorship, Mass Imprisonment, and the Long Struggle over Impunity
Overview
Uruguay is a pivotal case because it combines: (i) an institutional rupture led by a civilian president aligned with the armed forces, (ii) a repression model centred on mass political imprisonment and systematic torture, and (iii) a post-transition accountability pathway repeatedly constrained by legalised impunity, later challenged domestically and internationally. (britannica.com)
1) The coup mechanism: “self-coup” via dissolution of parliament (27 June 1973)
On 27 June 1973, President Juan María Bordaberry dissolved the legislature, inaugurating what is widely described as Uruguay’s civic–military dictatorship (1973–1985). (Wikipedia)
This matters analytically: unlike purely military seizures of power, Uruguay’s rupture illustrates how formal executive authority can be used to dismantle constitutional constraint while the armed forces become the decisive governing actor.
2) Repression at scale: political imprisonment and torture as routine governance
Uruguay’s dictatorship became internationally notorious for the scale of political detention. Amnesty International reports that, at the dictatorship’s peak, an estimated 7,000 political prisoners were detained, and “the overwhelming majority” alleged torture. (Amnesty International)
Contemporary legal/human-rights reporting also describes persistent torture and harsh detention conditions across the period (including into the late 1970s and early 1980s). (International Commission of Jurists)
3) The Condor connection: repression beyond borders (1976 as a “signature” year)
Uruguay’s case intersects directly with Operation Condor’s transnational logic. A U.S. State Department historical document explicitly links concern about the 1976 murders in Argentina of ex-Uruguayan parliamentarians Zelmar Michelini and Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz to broader regional security dynamics. (history.state.gov)
Those assassinations (carried out in Buenos Aires) became emblematic of a wider system in which exiles and opponents could be tracked, abducted, and killed outside their home states—precisely the “platform” dynamic explained in Episode 17. (history.state.gov)
4) The transition trigger: the failed constitutional project (30 November 1980)
A turning point was the 1980 plebiscite, in which voters rejected a proposed constitution intended to regularise the dictatorship’s political order. Scholarly analysis frames the plebiscite as a failed attempt to constitutionalise military rule—important because it shows how authoritarian regimes sometimes seek legal endurance rather than mere coercive control. (OUP Academic)
5) Democracy restored, but impunity entrenched: the 1986 “Expiry Law”
After the return to civilian rule, Uruguay enacted the Ley de Caducidad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado (1986) (“Expiry Law”), which significantly constrained investigation and prosecution of dictatorship-era crimes, giving the executive substantial gatekeeping power over cases. (Amnesty International)
This is central to the series’ theme: legal frameworks can be deployed not only to transfer power, but also to limit accountability and stabilise post-authoritarian settlements.
6) International legal pressure: Gelman v Uruguay (Inter-American Court, 2011)
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ judgment in Gelman v Uruguay (2011) is a cornerstone of the accountability arc. The Court addressed Uruguay’s obligations in relation to serious human-rights violations and the barriers created by impunity measures, becoming a major legal reference point for later domestic reforms and prosecutions. (corteidh.or.cr)
Subsequent UN human-rights commentary continued to highlight unresolved disappearances and structural challenges in achieving full accountability. (OHCHR)
7) Continuing legacy: disappearances, identification, and slow justice
Later reporting illustrates the prolonged nature of truth recovery. For example, Associated Press coverage describes Uruguay’s official count of 197 disappeared during the dictatorship period and notes the slow pace of identifications and trials relative to neighbouring Argentina. (AP News)
For the series, the point is methodological: in disappearance-based regimes, “the record” is often produced over decades through forensic work, archives, and litigation—not in a single post-transition moment.
References
Amnesty International (2011) ‘Uruguay amnesty vote a missed opportunity for justice’. Amnesty International, 20 May. (Amnesty International)
Britannica (n.d.) ‘Uruguay: The military regime’. Encyclopaedia Britannica. (britannica.com)
Britannica (n.d.) ‘Juan María Bordaberry Arocena’. Encyclopaedia Britannica. (britannica.com)
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2011) Case of Gelman v. Uruguay: Judgment of 24 February 2011 (Merits and Reparations). (corteidh.or.cr)
International Commission of Jurists (1980) Uruguay: Human rights and political prisoners (report, PDF). (International Commission of Jurists)
Katz, A.S. (2024) ‘No higher law: The Uruguayan plebiscite of 1980 as a failed constituent…’. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 22(2). (OUP Academic)
Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State (1976) ‘Historical Documents (FRUS): murders of Torres, Michelini and Gutiérrez Ruiz’ (document). (history.state.gov)
OHCHR (2013) ‘Transitional justice: “A chapter of Uruguay’s recent past is yet to be resolved adequately”’ (press release). (OHCHR)
Associated Press (2023) ‘Nearly 50 years after her death, Uruguay lays to rest a woman disappeared by its dictatorship’ (reporting on disappearances and identifications). (AP News)