Who controls the guns, the files, and the buildings
11.1 The core point
In Venezuela’s January 2026 rupture, the decisive question is not only legal succession but effective command: who can compel compliance across the armed forces, intelligence services, police, and armed civilian networks. That coercive coalition is the practical substrate of “government”, and it is precisely where the post-Maduro contest is concentrated. (Reuters)
11.2 The coercive coalition in Venezuela
A useful way to map the domestic power core is as four mutually reinforcing pillars:
- FANB / Defence hierarchy (armed forces)
The armed forces are not merely a national security institution; they have been embedded in state governance and, historically, rewarded with political and economic roles—making their loyalty a central variable in regime durability. (Le Monde.fr) - Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) and public-order enforcement
The GNB has functioned as a key instrument for crowd control, political policing, and coercive enforcement, and recent UN reporting has characterised patterns of abuse over a decade as systematic rather than incidental. (Reuters) - Intelligence and counterintelligence (SEBIN and DGCIM)
These bodies are structurally designed to manage “insider threats” (splits, defections, coup plotting) and “outsider threats” (opposition mobilisation). International reporting has repeatedly focused on intelligence services as central nodes of repression. (OHCHR) - Armed civilian/pro-government networks (“colectivos” and aligned groups)
These groups matter because they expand coercive reach while preserving plausible deniability. Post-election and post-crisis reporting by human rights organisations repeatedly treats pro-government armed groups as operational actors alongside state agencies. (Human Rights Watch)
11.3 Why this matters after January 2026: “continuity elites” vs “transition elites”
Reuters’ reporting on Delcy Rodríguez’s consolidation efforts describes internal division and highlights that her authority is constrained by other power centres—particularly figures with deep links to armed actors and security structures. (Reuters)
This yields a classic post-rupture configuration:
- Continuity elites: officials and commanders whose survival depends on (a) controlling coercive organs and (b) preventing retrospective accountability.
- Transition elites: actors who may accept a managed transition if (a) institutional continuity is preserved and (b) personal risk is bounded (amnesties, safe exits, immunities, or negotiated guarantees).
The tighter the perceived legal and personal risk to continuity elites, the greater the incentive to retain control of the coercive core even if political leadership becomes nominally “interim”. This is a standard logic in authoritarian successor crises, and it is visible in current reporting on intra-elite manoeuvring. (Reuters)
11.4 “Who holds the buildings”: the operational geometry of power
When observers say “the opposition cannot rule”, they usually mean that the opposition cannot reliably command:
- Government headquarters (Miraflores and core ministries)
- The administrative spine (interior ministry structures that direct policing, detention, and public order)
- The election–judiciary belt (institutions that certify or reject legitimacy claims)
- The revenue engine (PDVSA and oil export decision-chains, even where external accounts are controlled) (Reuters)
In practical terms, any leadership that cannot direct the GNB/public-order apparatus and cannot manage intelligence files and detention infrastructure is exposed to immediate destabilisation risk (work stoppages, street coercion, selective arrests, and bureaucratic sabotage). UN and NGO documentation of detention practices and enforced disappearance risks shows why control of these institutions is politically decisive. (Human Rights Watch)
11.5 The intelligence services: why DGCIM and SEBIN are “regime insurance”
Two dynamics make intelligence and counterintelligence central:
- Preventing splits inside the armed forces
Counterintelligence is designed to identify and neutralise dissident factions. Reuters reports that Rodríguez has moved quickly on security appointments, including at DGCIM, explicitly framed as consolidation against rivals. (Reuters) - Managing political opposition via detention and fear
Human rights reporting after the disputed 2024 election describes patterns of arbitrary detention, incommunicado detention, and coercion involving Venezuelan security bodies, with SEBIN frequently referenced in specific detention pathways. (Human Rights Watch)
The analytical takeaway is straightforward: political change is gated by the institutions that control “the files” (intelligence) and “the cells” (detention), not only by electoral or constitutional arguments. (OHCHR)
11.6 Armed civilian networks: the “extra-state” enforcement layer
Crisis Group has repeatedly warned that Venezuela contains multiple armed actors whose incentives can undercut any rapid restoration of rule of law if the centre fractures. (crisisgroup.org)
HRW likewise treats pro-government armed groups as relevant perpetrators in the post-election repression cycle. (Human Rights Watch)
Functionally, these networks create three risks in a transition environment:
- Plausible deniability (violence can be attributed to “uncontrolled actors”)
- Escalation control problems (local commanders or groups can trigger spirals)
- Negotiation sabotage (armed spoilers can punish compromise)
This is why “holding the buildings” is not simply about formal command: it is about containing or co-opting armed semi-autonomous actors in the state’s orbit. (Reuters)
11.7 What stability actually requires (descriptively, not prescriptively)
From a political-institutional standpoint, a durable pathway requires three conditions to align:
- Unified command over the coercive apparatus (or, at minimum, non-contestation).
- Credible incentives and protections that reduce “fight-to-the-end” dynamics among continuity elites.
- Legitimacy and resources sufficient to govern day-to-day (payroll, imports, public order), because coercion without administrative capacity tends to generate chronic instability.
Where these conditions fail, the likely pattern is not immediate “opposition rule”, but fragmented sovereignty: competing chains of command, rival enforcement nodes, and periodic coercive demonstrations intended to prove who is still in control. (Reuters)
11.8 Transition to Episode 12
Episode 12 moves outward: how regional states (Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Mexico) and hemispheric institutions interpret these coercive realities, and why South America does not form an “Asian-style wall” in response.
References
Crisis Group (2025) The Peril of Ousting Maduro. (crisisgroup.org)
Crisis Group (2026) Venezuela after Maduro: Transaction or Transition? (crisisgroup.org)
Human Rights Watch (2025) Punished for Seeking Change: Killings, Enforced Disappearances and Arbitrary Detention Following Venezuela’s 2024 Election. (Human Rights Watch)
Human Rights Watch (2025) Venezuela: Brutal Crackdown Since Elections (news release). (Human Rights Watch)
Le Monde (2024) ‘Venezuela: Maduro’s government still relies on army support’ (analysis report). (Le Monde.fr)
OHCHR (2025) Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela: Detailed conclusions (A/HRC/60/CRP.4). (OHCHR)
Reuters (2025) ‘Venezuela’s National Guard committed crimes against humanity over decade, UN report says’. (Reuters)
Reuters (2026) ‘Venezuela’s new leader, facing internal division, moves to tighten her grip on power’. (Reuters)
Reuters (2026) ‘Venezuela’s Rodriguez proposes oil reform to ease investment’ (context on institutional control and post-capture governance). (Reuters)
Real Instituto Elcano (n.d.) The Armed Forces as a Political Party: Chávez’s New “Geometry of Power” (analysis). (Real Instituto Elcano)
U.S. Department of State (2025) 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Venezuela. (State Department)