Why the armed forces and security services determine whether any transition “works”
3.1 The central proposition
Constitutional succession (Episode 2) defines who should rule. In Venezuela’s January 2026 crisis, the determining variable is who can enforce rule—which sits primarily with the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) and the wider internal security ecosystem (military counterintelligence, civilian intelligence, police special units, and pro-government irregular groups). Reuters’ reporting on the post-Maduro landscape frames this as a civilian–military balance inside the ruling coalition, with competing patronage networks that cannot be dismantled simply by removing the president. (Reuters, 2026c). (Reuters)
3.2 Formal command is not the same as effective command
On paper, Venezuela has a conventional chain of command (Commander-in-Chief → Defence Minister → operational commands). In practice, effective command depends on three interlocking layers:
- Operational military command (FANB) – control of bases, logistics, and territorial presence.
- Counterintelligence and civilian intelligence – control of surveillance, detention, and elite discipline.
- Irregular pro-government enforcement – neighbourhood-level coercion and intimidation, often acting as “force multipliers” during political stress.
This matters because transitions fail when the opposition gains legal authority but cannot obtain compliance from the people who control weapons, files, prisons, and buildings.
3.3 The “hinge” institutions: FANB, National Guard, DGCIM, SEBIN, and colectivos
3.3.1 FANB and Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino López
Reuters identifies Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino López as the figure who “commands the armed forces” and is seen by U.S. officials as crucial to avoiding a power vacuum during a transition—while simultaneously being a long-standing regime pillar with his own incentives and exit calculations. (Reuters, 2026a). (Reuters)
Analytically, Padrino’s relevance is structural: even if a civilian interim arrangement exists, units still take orders through military channels, and senior commanders can enable or obstruct a transfer of authority through compliance, delay, or selective enforcement.
3.3.2 The Bolivarian National Guard (GNB): internal control, not only border security
The GNB is particularly important because it sits at the boundary between “military” and “public order.” A UN Fact-Finding Mission finding (reported by Reuters in December 2025) concluded that the GNB committed serious violations and crimes against humanity over more than a decade, describing patterns of coordinated repression and an expanded role in social control under a centralised chain of command overseen by the president as Commander-in-Chief. (Reuters, 2025). (Reuters)
For January 2026, this is not merely a human-rights point. It indicates that the GNB functions as a domestic enforcement arm, meaning any transition that does not secure GNB compliance faces immediate practical barriers: crowd control, arrests, protection of ministries, and the ability to prevent rival actors from occupying state spaces.
3.3.3 DGCIM and SEBIN: elite discipline through intelligence power
Two intelligence bodies recur across credible reporting and UN documentation:
- DGCIM (military counterintelligence) – central for monitoring the armed forces and neutralising dissent within the officer corps.
- SEBIN (civilian intelligence) – central for monitoring opposition and civil society.
The UN’s Fact-Finding Mission has repeatedly emphasised the reliance of the Venezuelan state on intelligence services to repress dissent, including allegations of torture and sexual violence, and has published detailed findings on the role of intelligence structures. (OHCHR, 2022; UN Human Rights Council, 2022). (OHCHR)
U.S. State Department reporting similarly references patterns of detention involving SEBIN and DGCIM. (U.S. Department of State, 2024). (State Department)
In Reuters’ January 2026 reporting, control of DGCIM is treated as a core stake in the internal power struggle. It notes that Rodríguez appointed a new head of DGCIM and describes the agency as “feared” and “built over decades with Cuban assistance,” underscoring DGCIM’s institutional weight in elite politics. (Reuters, 2026b). (Reuters)
3.3.4 Diosdado Cabello and “colectivos”: coercion beyond the formal state
Reuters’ January 2026 profiles depict Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello as feared for influence over DGCIM and over pro-government motorcycle gangs (“colectivos”) associated with intimidation of opposition supporters. (Reuters, 2026a). (Reuters)
In the same Reuters reporting line, Cabello is framed as a principal hardline pole and a potential internal threat to Rodríguez’s consolidation. (Reuters, 2026b). (Reuters)
Human Rights Watch characterises colectivos as armed pro-government groups linked to intimidation and violence in political contexts, including around the 2024 election period. (Human Rights Watch, 2024; Human Rights Watch, 2025a). (Human Rights Watch)
Implication: even if a new legal authority is declared, coercive capacity may remain distributed across (i) formal security institutions and (ii) irregular allied actors. That distribution complicates “clean” transitions because it creates multiple veto players with local enforcement capacity.
3.4 How loyalty is maintained: patronage, fear, and “exit risks”
Reuters’ January 2026 reporting explicitly notes that generals’ loyalty has been secured through profits from illicit trade and smuggling routes, indicating an embedded political economy rather than a purely ideological chain of command. (Reuters, 2026c). (Reuters)
A useful way to conceptualise this is an “authoritarian coalition” model:
- Patronage: access to rents (licit and illicit) tied to state control.
- Mutual exposure: individuals fear loss of protection, prosecution, or sanctions if the coalition breaks.
- Surveillance: intelligence services deter internal defection.
- Parallel enforcement: irregular allies raise the cost of mass mobilisation against the coalition.
Resource zones reinforce this logic. International reporting and policy documents describe Venezuela’s southern mining economy (gold and other minerals) as a site of criminality, armed control, and state-enabled extraction, creating additional rent streams and security interests beyond oil. (U.S. Department of State, 2025; Transparencia Venezuela, 2025; The Guardian, 2025). (State Department)
3.5 What this means for “why the opposition doesn’t simply take over”
This episode’s conclusion is blunt but empirically grounded:
- Legal authority is not self-executing. A rival claimant can be “recognised” without controlling buildings, budgets, forces, or prisons.
- The security apparatus is internally segmented. Control is contested among actors whose authority rests on coercion and intelligence access (e.g., DGCIM leadership, interior ministry networks, military command). (Reuters, 2026b; Reuters, 2026a). (Reuters)
- The cost of defection is high. Where credible allegations and sanctions exist, elites may perceive regime change as existential rather than political—reducing willingness to negotiate without robust guarantees.
3.6 Practical transition scenarios: how the security sector shapes outcomes
From a political-security standpoint, January 2026 presents four plausible pathways, each defined by security-sector alignment:
- Consolidated continuity under Rodríguez
Rodríguez retains the coalition by managing Cabello, keeping Padrino aligned, and controlling DGCIM appointments—while meeting external demands (notably oil output and stability). (Reuters, 2026b). (Reuters) - Elite split inside the regime
A fracture between hardline internal-security networks and technocratic/transactional factions could produce paralysis, selective enforcement, or bargaining for immunity/exit. - Security-sector fracture (high instability)
If coercive institutions split at the operational level (units, regions, or commands), the risk shifts from “authoritarian continuity” to contested sovereignty, including localised violence. - Negotiated reconfiguration with guarantees
A transition becomes plausible if credible guarantees address the security elite’s perceived downside—typically involving phased reforms, external monitoring, and sequencing that avoids immediate winner-takes-all outcomes.
3.7 Indicators to watch (as the series proceeds)
If you want an evidence-led way to “track” the transition, the most telling indicators are:
- Appointments and purges in DGCIM / SEBIN / GNB leadership (signals of who controls coercion). (Reuters, 2026b). (Reuters)
- Public unity displays (who appears beside whom; who disappears). (Reuters, 2026c). (Reuters)
- Territorial enforcement patterns (arrests, raids, protest response), which the UN and rights groups have documented as systematic in prior cycles. (Reuters, 2025; OHCHR, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2025a). (Reuters)
Where Episode 4 goes next
Episode 4 will move from the domestic coercive state to the external layer: foreign intervention, recognition politics, and the “who controls the money” problem (oil proceeds, sanctions architecture, and the leverage of external sponsors).
References
Human Rights Watch (2024) ‘Venezuela: Brutal Crackdown on Protesters, Voters’, 4 September. (Human Rights Watch)
Human Rights Watch (2025a) ‘World Report 2025: Venezuela’. (Human Rights Watch)
OHCHR (2022) ‘Venezuela: new UN report details responsibilities for crimes against humanity’, 20 September. (OHCHR)
Reuters (2025) ‘Venezuela’s National Guard committed crimes against humanity over decade, UN report says’, 11 December. (Reuters)
Reuters (2026a) ‘Who’s really running Venezuela?’, 13 January. (Reuters)
Reuters (2026b) ‘Venezuela’s new leader, facing internal division, moves to tighten her grip on power’, 17 January. (Reuters)
Reuters (2026c) ‘Maduro is out but his top allies still hold power in Venezuela’, 4 January. (Reuters)
Transparencia Venezuela (2025) Gold Mining in Venezuela (report), April. (Transparencia Venezuela)
The Guardian (2025) ‘Drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping: the lawless rush for rare earth minerals in Venezuela’, 7 November. (The Guardian)
UN Human Rights Council (2022) Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/51/43). (United Nations Documentation)
U.S. Department of State (2024) ‘2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Venezuela’. (State Department)
U.S. Department of State (2025) Report to Congress on the State-Sponsored Extraction and Sale of Gold from Venezuela’s Orinoco (report). (State Department)