In the strategic world, history does not repeat, but it often rhymes. To understand the 2026 arrests of General Zhang Youxia and General Liu Zhenli, one must look back at the “intelligence earthquakes” that rocked the Kremlin in early 2022. The parallels between Putin’s pre-invasion purges and Xi’s current actions suggest that China is attempting to bypass the failures that crippled Russia’s “Special Military Operation.”
I. The Case of the “Misleading Spies” (2022 vs. 2026)
Two weeks after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin launched a sudden assault on his own intelligence apparatus, specifically the FSB’s 5th Service.
- The Russian Purge: Colonel-General Sergey Beseda and his deputy were placed under house arrest (and later transferred to the infamous Lefortovo Prison). Officially, they were charged with embezzlement; in reality, they had provided “rose-tinted” intelligence, promising Putin that Ukrainian resistance would crumble and Russian troops would be welcomed with flowers (Borogan and Soldatov, 2022).
- The Chinese Mirror: Fast-forward to 2026: Xi Jinping’s arrest of Zhang Youxia follows a similar pattern of “purging the planners.” Analysts argue that Zhang likely expressed skepticism regarding the 2027 readiness timeline, colliding with Xi’s political urgency (FAF, 2026). Like Beseda, Zhang is being removed for a perceived “intelligence failure”—either providing false data or, as the WSJ suggests, leaking the true data to the enemy.
II. The Public Humiliation as a Tool of Control
In February 2022, Putin televised a Security Council meeting where he publicly bullied Sergey Naryshkin (Foreign Intelligence Chief), forcing him to “speak directly” and support the invasion on camera (El País, 2022).
- Strategic Intent: This was a “loyalty test” designed to ensure that no one in the inner circle could later claim they were against the war.
- Xi’s Version: Xi has taken this a step further. By arresting his childhood friend and “Princeling” ally, Zhang Youxia, he is sending a message more powerful than any televised scolding: No one is indispensable. This is “reflexive control” at its most ruthless—purging the top tier to ensure the middle tier operates in a state of absolute, terrified obedience (Chosun, 2026).
III. The Intelligence Trap: The “Trojan Horse” Theory
A critical difference exists between the two cases. Putin’s purges were a reaction to failure. Xi’s purges are preemptive. This leads to the “Intelligence Trap” hypothesis:
- Reflexive Control: In Soviet doctrine, this involves feeding an opponent information that leads them to a self-defeating conclusion. By publicising a “Nuclear Leak” and arresting a top general, Beijing may be inducing the U.S. into a state of overconfidence (Thomas, 2023).
- The Bait: If the U.S. believes the PLA is “decapitated” and “corrupt,” it may slow its own defensive build-up in the Pacific, providing China with the “surprise” window it needs for a 2026 move on Taiwan.
Summary: Lessons Learned from Moscow
Xi Jinping has treated the war in Ukraine as a “masterclass in what not to do.” He has observed that Putin’s greatest mistake was trusting a military command that was more interested in skimming budgets than winning wars. The 2026 purge is Xi’s “Audit by Fire”—removing the “Rot” (and the realists) before the first shot is even fired (USNI, 2023).
References
- Borogan, I. and Soldatov, A. (2022) ‘Putin Places Spies Under House Arrest’, CEPA, 11 March.
- Chosun Daily (2026) ‘Xi Jinping Concludes Military Purge With Top Officials’ Removal’, Chosun, 26 January.
- El País (2022) ‘Sergey Naryshkin: The Russian spy boss humiliated by Putin’, EL PAÍS English, 23 February.
- Foreign Affairs Forum (FAF) (2026) ‘Why Xi Jinping Cannot Sleep: Understanding China’s Military Purge’, FAF, 27 January.
- Thomas, T. L. (2023) Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Information Warfare. Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office.
- USNI News (2023) ‘Russian Military Failures in Ukraine Should be ‘Sobering’ for China’, USNI, 5 July.