Chapter 12: Kherson, Kharkiv, and the Counteroffensive (Late 2022 – Early 2023)

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The Bear and the Eagle

Volume 2: The Biden–Xi Reset or Rivalry (2021–2022)

September 2022 – March 2023
Kyiv – Kherson – Kharkiv – Moscow – Washington – Warsaw

In the late months of 2022, a shift occurred—not just in the momentum of war, but in the strategic imagination of the West. What had once been a defensive struggle for Ukraine’s survival transformed into a campaign of liberation and reversal.

Two key battles—Kharkiv in the northeast, and Kherson in the south—became turning points.
For the first time since the full-scale invasion began, Ukraine not only resisted but regained territory at speed and scale.

The Russian bear, wounded and reactive, recalibrated.
The Western eagle, alert and resupplied, soared back into a long war posture.

Kharkiv Offensive – Lightning in the East

On 6 September 2022, after months of attritional fighting in the Donbas, Ukrainian forces launched a surprise counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region. In just five days, Ukraine liberated over 8,000 square kilometres, including the key logistical hub of Izyum—abandoned by retreating Russian forces.

Key factors in Ukraine’s success:

  • Western intelligence and targeting data provided in near real time
  • Ukrainian forces using U.S.-supplied HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems) to devastate Russian supply depots
  • Depleted and demoralised Russian units, many of which were understrength and poorly commanded

Russian soldiers fled positions, leaving behind tanks, ammunition, and equipment. Pro-Kremlin military bloggers openly criticised the Ministry of Defence—an unprecedented rupture in Putin’s domestic narrative (ISW, 2022).

Kherson – The Southern Liberation

Unlike Kharkiv’s blitz, the battle for Kherson was a grinding campaign of pressure, deception, and siege.

Kherson, the only regional capital captured by Russia since February, was symbolically and strategically vital. Ukrainian forces:

  • Conducted weeks of precision strikes against bridges over the Dnipro River, cutting off Russian resupply routes
  • Employed psychological warfare, urging civilians to evacuate and signalling that liberation was imminent
  • Utilised NATO-standard tactics to target command and control centres

On 11 November 2022, Russia completed its withdrawal from Kherson city, retreating to the east bank of the Dnipro. Ukrainian soldiers marched into the city to jubilant crowds waving blue and yellow flags.

President Zelenskyy declared:

“This is the beginning of the end of the war.”
— Zelenskyy, Kherson, 14 November 2022

Russia Responds: Mobilisation and Missiles

Reeling from battlefield losses, Putin escalated:

  1. Partial Mobilisation (21 September 2022)
    • 300,000 Russian reservists were called up
    • Triggered mass exodus: over 500,000 men fled Russia to avoid conscription (BBC, 2022)
  2. Annexation of Four Ukrainian Regions
    • On 30 September 2022, Russia claimed to annex Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson
    • The move was globally condemned—not recognised by any Western nation, even as fighting raged within those territories
  3. Missile Campaign Against Ukraine’s Energy Grid
    • From October onward, Russia launched hundreds of cruise missiles and drones
    • Objective: destroy power, water, and heating infrastructure during winter
    • Result: rolling blackouts in Kyiv, Lviv, and Odesa, but Ukrainian resilience endured

Western-supplied air defences, including NASAMS, IRIS-T, and Patriot systems, gradually mitigated the aerial threat.

Western Support Deepens

The successful Ukrainian offensives led to:

  • Expanded arms packages, including:
    • German Leopard 2 tanks
    • U.S. Bradley Fighting Vehicles
    • Longer-range artillery and drone technology
  • Increased training programmes for Ukrainian soldiers in Poland, the UK, and Germany
  • Continued financial aid:
    • By end of 2022, U.S. support surpassed $50 billion
    • EU pledged €18 billion for budgetary support and reconstruction (EU Council, 2022)

In Washington, bipartisan consensus held despite the Republican retake of the House in November 2022.
But voices of scepticism—led by the “America First” caucus—began to question “blank cheque” aid as the 2024 election approached.

Putin’s Domestic Stalemate

Despite the military setbacks, Putin remained firmly in power:

  • Navalny remained imprisoned, isolated in penal colonies
  • Independent journalism was extinguished, and social media censorship tightened
  • Public protest was rare, though discontent simmered in draft offices and regional towns

The Russian economy, though battered by sanctions, survived via:

  • Record oil revenues from non-Western buyers
  • A still-active shadow financial network
  • Support from China, India, Turkey, and Iran

But Russian military logistics were stretched. Ammunition shortages, poor command structure, and low troop morale fed a growing reality: Russia could not win a short war.

The War Goes Long

By early 2023, both sides were dug in:

  • Ukraine aimed to recapture the south and advance towards Crimea
  • Russia fortified defensive lines in Zaporizhzhia and Luhansk, betting on Western fatigue

The global community braced for a long war—one that would define not only the fate of Ukraine, but the shape of 21st-century alliances, the role of NATO, and the limits of authoritarian revisionism.

The counteroffensives had changed the map.

But the battle for history itself was still being fought.

References

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