Venezuela’s “three sources of power” after Operation Absolute Resolve
1.1 What happened, and why “arrest” did not settle authority
The removal of Nicolás Maduro by a United States operation on 3 January 2026 created an acute governance dilemma because Venezuela’s state authority does not reside in a single office-holder. In the immediate aftermath, three competing bases of authority became visible at once:
- Constitutional authority (what the constitution prescribes for presidential absence).
- De facto authority (who controls coercive institutions and the administrative apparatus on the ground).
- External coercive influence (the capacity of a foreign state to remove, constrain, or condition domestic governance). (Reuters)
This is why a “capture” can be decisive in a tactical sense yet still produce an unstable, dual-centre political order: the office is disrupted, but the system that implements orders (military, intelligence, police, courts, finance ministries, and public administration) may persist largely intact. (Reuters)
1.2 The constitutional trigger: “absence” and the succession pathway
Venezuela’s 1999 Constitution distinguishes between permanent unavailability (often discussed as “absolute absence”) and temporary unavailability of the president.
- Article 233 sets out circumstances constituting permanent unavailability and provides that, if it occurs during the first four years of a term, a new election must be held within 30 consecutive days, with the Executive Vice-President serving as acting president pending election and inauguration. (Constitute Project)
- Article 234 addresses temporary unavailability: the Executive Vice-President substitutes for up to 90 days, extendable once for a further 90 days, and prolonged absence can be reclassified by the National Assembly. (Constitute Project)
In the first 48 hours after the operation, the Supreme Tribunal’s Constitutional Chamber ordered Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to assume the role of acting president “to guarantee administrative continuity” while it debated the “applicable legal framework” for the “forced absence” of the President. (Reuters)
The critical analytical point is that classification (“temporary” vs “permanent”) is not merely legal semantics; it determines whether the system is forced into a rapid electoral timetable (Article 233) or can be stabilised under an interim arrangement (Article 234). (Constitute Project)
1.3 The emergence of a “double-leadership” configuration
By 5 January 2026, Reuters reported Rodríguez was formally sworn in as interim president as Maduro appeared in a New York court, with the governing party retaining dominance in the legislature. (Reuters)
At the same time, reporting described a durable governing network in Caracas—senior officials and security institutions—seeking to preserve continuity and limit immediate displacement by opposition forces. Reuters characterised this as a small, powerful cabal that remained intact despite Maduro’s removal. (Reuters)
This produced the core “double-leadership” dynamic:
- A domestically seated interim head of government operating through existing institutions; and
- An externally driven transition agenda shaped by US enforcement capacity and conditionality. (Reuters)
1.4 Why the opposition did not automatically take power
Even where the opposition claims an electoral mandate, immediate governing authority typically requires (at minimum) access to: (i) commanded coercion, (ii) administrative control, and (iii) institutional validation (courts/electoral bodies) sufficient to make orders executable.
Reuters reporting underscored that US decision-making initially sidelined key opposition figures, while the internal apparatus remained anchored in officials with long-standing roles inside the regime. (Reuters)
In practical terms, this meant that the opposition’s pathway to power depended on negotiated transfer, coercive realignment, or externally imposed restructuring—rather than legal argument alone.
1.5 The coercive centre: why the armed forces matter more than proclamations
Venezuela’s armed forces and internal security bodies are pivotal because they arbitrate who can:
- occupy ministries and broadcast infrastructure,
- enforce court rulings,
- protect (or remove) senior office-holders, and
- secure oil and customs revenue points.
Reuters identified Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino López and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello as central power-holders, with Cabello linked to control over military counterintelligence (DGCIM) and colectivos, and Padrino’s role as commander making him essential to preventing a vacuum. (Reuters)
Accordingly, Episode 1’s organising conclusion is straightforward: constitutional succession can name an acting president, but only coercive compliance can make that presidency real.
1.6 The external dimension: legality disputes and international positioning
International reaction rapidly focused on the use of force and precedent. China’s UN mission condemned US strikes and seizure of Maduro as violations of sovereign equality, non-interference, and the prohibition on force under the UN Charter. (China Mission to the UN)
The UN system’s legal baseline is that states must refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (UN Charter Article 2(4) principle).
UN human rights mechanisms and officials publicly warned of destabilisation and the dangerous precedent created by unilateral military action. (United Nations)
European statements, while emphasising democracy and Venezuelan-led resolution, also stressed international law and the UN Charter as the governing framework for crisis management. (Reuters)
This matters because recognition and external support can influence financial access, sanctions outcomes, and diplomatic room to manoeuvre—yet recognition alone does not substitute for internal coercive and administrative control.
1.7 What this episode establishes for the series
Episode 1 sets the baseline claim the series will test across cases and comparisons:
- Leadership removal is not regime change unless the “state machine” (security + administration + fiscal channels) is reconfigured. (Reuters)
- Venezuela’s constitution supplies pathways, but the political system can strategically contest the category of “absence” to avoid rapid elections. (Constitute Project)
- External coercion can decisively alter the bargaining range, but it simultaneously triggers legality disputes and counter-mobilisation by rival powers. (China Mission to the UN)
Next episode (Episode 2) will examine the succession articles (233–234) in operational detail—specifically how “temporary” framing, court rulings, and institutional capture can preserve continuity even when the head of state is removed.
References
China, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations (2026) Remarks on Venezuela by Ambassador Sun Lei… at the UN Security Council Emergency Meeting (5 January). (China Mission to the UN)
Chatham House (2026) The US capture of President Nicolás Maduro – and attacks on Venezuela – have no justification in international law (4 January). (Chatham House)
Constitute Project (2009) Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1999 (rev. 2009) Constitution (Articles 233–234). (Constitute Project)
European External Action Service (EEAS) (2026) Venezuela: Statement by the High Representative on the aftermath of the US intervention in Venezuela (4 January). (EEAS)
Office of the UN Secretary-General (2026a) Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on Venezuela (3 January). (United Nations)
Office of the UN Secretary-General (2026b) Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council on Venezuela (5 January). (United Nations)
OHCHR (2026) UN experts condemn US aggression against Venezuela (press release, January). (OHCHR)
Reuters (2026a) Venezuela’s Supreme Court orders Delcy Rodriguez become interim president (4 January). (Reuters)
Reuters (2026b) Maduro is out but his top allies still hold power in Venezuela (4 January). (Reuters)
Reuters (2026c) Delcy Rodriguez formally sworn in as Venezuela’s interim president (5 January). (Reuters)
Reuters (2026d) Who’s really running Venezuela? (13 January). (Reuters)
UN Office of Legal Affairs (2020) Repertory of Practice: Article 2(4) and the principle of non-use of force (document excerpting Charter practice).