Journal entry, 19 January 2026 (London)
China enters the Greenland crisis in an unusual way: not as an active party to the dispute, but as the named justification for an ultimatum. Washington’s case has repeatedly implied that US control of Greenland is required to prevent future Russian or Chinese encroachment. Beijing’s response has therefore focused less on Greenland itself and more on contesting the legitimacy of that security narrative.
1) The trigger: Greenland justified as a hedge against Russia and China
Reuters reported President Trump arguing that the United States “needs to own Greenland” to prevent Russia or China from occupying it in the future. (Reuters)
That framing matters because it attempts to transform a sovereignty dispute into a preventive security measure—placing China in the role of an implied adversary regardless of Beijing’s actual behaviour in Greenland.
2) Beijing’s official line: “stop using the so-called ‘China threat’ as a pretext”
On 19 January, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson (Guo Jiakun) stated that China had “repeatedly” made its position clear and urged the US to stop using the “so-called ‘China threat’” as a pretext for pursuing selfish gains. (Xinhua News)
In the same line of messaging, the spokesperson anchored China’s position in international law and the UN Charter, presenting the episode as one where the “purposes and principles of the UN Charter” should govern relations between states. (gb.china-embassy.gov.cn)
This is a deliberate choice: rather than debating Arctic security specifics on US terms, China reframes the dispute as a rules-and-process question (legitimacy, consent, sovereignty) in which coercion is presumptively suspect.
3) Distancing, not mobilisation: China avoids becoming a “party” to the quarrel
China’s tone is not that of a state seeking to insert itself into Greenland negotiations; it is the tone of a state refusing to be instrumentalised as the rhetorical basis for coercion. Reporting on subsequent briefings indicates China positioning itself as “a positive, stabilising and constructive force” and rejecting the premise that it is competing for influence in Greenland. (The Straits Times)
This is consistent with strategic risk management: Beijing can benefit from transatlantic strain, but it has little incentive to be seen as driving a dispute in a NATO theatre—especially where its stated interests can be advanced more effectively through general Arctic diplomacy, trade, and long-run narrative positioning.
4) The secondary message: Europe should reassess dependence on the US
While the foreign ministry maintained a measured line, Chinese state-linked commentary has been less restrained. Coverage notes that Chinese state media urged Europe to reassess its security dependence on Washington—an information strategy that treats the crisis as evidence of US unreliability and European vulnerability. (The Straits Times)
This is the central Chinese opportunity: without siding with Denmark or the US, Beijing can still amplify a conclusion that serves its broader geopolitical interests—namely, that the transatlantic relationship is unstable and that “strategic autonomy” is rational.
What this episode establishes
China’s posture is best described as non-aligned exploitation:
- It rejects the “China threat” rationale as baseless and self-serving. (Xinhua News)
- It leans on UN Charter language to delegitimise coercive bargaining over territory. (gb.china-embassy.gov.cn)
- It keeps distance from the operational dispute, while allowing Chinese commentary to encourage Europe to question its dependence on the US. (The Straits Times)
The result is a familiar pattern: Beijing does not need to “support” Washington to benefit from a crisis that weakens alliance cohesion; it simply needs to contest the narrative used to justify coercion and present itself as the more predictable defender of rules-based order.
References
China Embassy in the United Kingdom (2026) ‘MFA Spokesperson reiterates China’s position on Greenland’ (Guo Jiakun, transcript), 20 January. (gb.china-embassy.gov.cn)
Reuters (2026) ‘Trump says US needs to own Greenland to deter Russia, China’, 9–10 January. (Reuters)
Straits Times (2026) ‘China distances itself from Greenland issue but warns against US dependence’, 21 January. (The Straits Times)
Xinhua (2026) ‘China urges U.S. to stop using so-called “China threat” as pretext for pursuing selfish gains’, 19 January. (Xinhua News)
CGTN (2026) ‘China rejects use of “China threat” narrative on Greenland: spokesperson’, 22 January. (CGTN News)