Journal entry, 19 January 2026 (London)
From Europe, the Greenland dispute can look like a pure executive-driven escalation. From inside the United States, it reads differently: a policy with a thin public mandate, visible congressional cross-pressure, and a steep political penalty for any hint of military coercion against a NATO ally.
1) The public opinion anchor: low support, high uncertainty, near-zero appetite for force
A Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted 12–13 January 2026 found that only 17% of Americans approved of U.S. efforts to acquire Greenland, while 47% disapproved and 35% were unsure. (Reuters)
The same polling shows that using military force to take Greenland from Denmark is viewed as a bad idea by 71%, with just 4% calling it a good idea. (Reuters)
Two additional findings sharpen the domestic constraint:
- Alliance damage is salient: 66% worried the Greenland effort would damage NATO and U.S. relations with European allies. (Reuters)
- Territorial force is broadly unpopular: only 10% agreed the U.S. “should use military force to obtain new territory, like Greenland and the Panama Canal”. (Reuters)
The political implication is straightforward: even if coercive tariffs are legally feasible, the domestic legitimacy for coercion—especially force—appears minimal.
2) Congress signals friction: reassurance travel, “rein-in” talk, and competing bills
Reuters reported that a bipartisan congressional delegation planned travel to Denmark, paired with statements emphasising respect for Denmark’s and Greenland’s sovereignty and warning that threats would weaken NATO. (Reuters)
Importantly, Reuters also reported lawmakers anticipating that the U.S. Senate would eventually vote on legislation seeking to rein in Trump’s ability to attempt to seize Greenland. (Reuters)
The legislative landscape is not one-sided. Reuters notes:
- A Republican bill (the Greenland Annexation and Statehood Act, introduced by Rep. Randy Fine) designed to authorise annexation if passed. (Reuters)
- A Democratic counter-bill (the Greenland Sovereignty Protection Act, planned by Rep. Jimmy Gomez) designed to block federal funding for takeover plans. (Reuters)
That juxtaposition matters: it indicates not only partisan contestation, but an early move towards the appropriations lever—a predictable mechanism by which Congress can constrain execution even when rhetoric escalates.
3) The executive dilemma: maximal rhetoric meets institutional and electoral gravity
Reuters reporting also indicates that White House officials discussed multiple pathways to control, including lump-sum payments to Greenlanders and the possibility of force—ideas that, once circulating, intensify domestic scrutiny and opposition. (Reuters)
This creates a familiar U.S. political trap: rhetoric can be escalated quickly, but the domestic coalition required to sustain costly or risky action—especially anything implicating conflict with a NATO ally—is absent or fragile. Public uncertainty (large “not sure” shares) adds volatility rather than support: the electorate is not firmly persuaded; it is only weakly attentive and easily alarmed by alliance rupture. (Reuters)
4) What the domestic constraint actually does
By 19 January, these internal signals produce three practical effects:
- They strengthen European resolve: allies can credibly assume that U.S. escalation beyond tariffs would meet heavy domestic resistance. (Reuters)
- They raise the premium on “deal language”: the executive has incentives to frame outcomes as security “frameworks” or negotiated arrangements rather than annexation, because the latter lacks public backing. (Reuters)
- They keep Congress relevant: once lawmakers begin discussing funding blocks and “rein-in” legislation, the dispute is no longer purely diplomatic—it becomes a domestic separation-of-powers contest played out in public. (Reuters)
In short: Washington’s bargaining posture may be aggressive, but it is operating atop a narrow domestic base—one that sharply penalises coercion against allies and treats military seizure as politically toxic.
References
Ipsos (2026) Americans oppose using military force to take possession of Greenland (Reuters/Ipsos poll release), 14 January. (Ipsos)
Ipsos (2026) Reuters Ipsos Greenland Survey Topline & Methodology (PDF), 13–14 January. (Ipsos)
Reuters (2026a) ‘US lawmakers plan Denmark visit as Trump threatens Greenland takeover’, 13 January. (Reuters)
Reuters (2026b) ‘Just one in five Americans support Trump’s efforts to acquire Greenland, Reuters/Ipsos poll finds’, 14–15 January. (Reuters)
Reuters (2026c) ‘How Americans view Trump’s ambitions for Greenland’ (Investigations explainer), 16 January. (Reuters)