Journal entry, 19 January 2026 (London)
Russia’s posture in the Greenland crisis is often described in shorthand as “enjoying the chaos”. That is accurate, but incomplete. Moscow is pursuing a three-layer strategy: (1) reject the claim that Russia is the Greenland threat, (2) exploit transatlantic friction for advantage in Europe and Ukraine, and (3) avoid over-committing to a US agenda that could still threaten Russia’s own Arctic priorities. (Reuters)
1) The first move: deny the premise — “Russia is not threatening Greenland”
Russia’s Foreign Ministry has pushed back hard against Western narratives that frame Moscow (and Beijing) as the reason the United States must control Greenland. Reuters reports Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova calling it unacceptable for the West to keep claiming Russia and China threaten Greenland, saying no facts had been presented and that neither state has announced any such plans. (Reuters)
This is not mere rhetoric. It is a legitimacy strike: if Russia is not a demonstrated threat, then the core security justification for coercive acquisition collapses into a power grab framed as “defence”.
2) The second move: celebrate Europe’s discomfort — without formally siding with Washington
On 19 January, Reuters describes a visible gloating line in Moscow: state-linked commentators and senior figures mocking European governments for being “at a loss” under tariff threats, and depicting the episode as unprecedented strain on NATO and EU cohesion. (Reuters)
The reporting captures multiple examples of this posture: commentary in Russian media, Medvedev’s taunting of Europe, and Kirill Dmitriev’s public mocking of transatlantic unity—all framed as Europe’s problem, not Russia’s. (Reuters)
This is classic wedge-driving: maximise alliance friction while keeping official commitments minimal.
3) The “delicate line”: Greenland is useful as a wedge, but dangerous as an Arctic precedent
Reuters is clear that Moscow is “treading a delicate line”. Russia is satisfied by transatlantic division, yet Trump’s moves could affect Russia’s own ambitions in an Arctic rich in resources and strategic leverage. (Reuters)
Two constraints shape that caution:
- Arctic balance-of-power risk: a stronger, more assertive US posture in Greenland can translate into greater US leverage across Arctic routes, surveillance, and military positioning—directly intersecting Russia’s strategic environment. (Reuters)
- Ukraine prioritisation: Reuters notes Ukraine remains the higher priority for Moscow, and a rift involving states financing and arming Kyiv could benefit Russia by spilling into other policy domains and overshadowing Ukraine. (Reuters)
In other words, Moscow prefers the division the Greenland dispute creates, but is wary of the strategic consequences of US territorial expansionism and unpredictability.
4) Why this is not “Russia siding with the US”
It is tempting to interpret Russian mockery of Europe as pro-US alignment. The evidence points elsewhere:
- Russia rejects the US justification that Russia is the imminent Greenland threat. (Reuters)
- Russia’s public commentary focuses on Europe’s pain and NATO strain, not on endorsing acquisition as legitimate. (Reuters)
- Russian voices also warn about Trump’s unpredictability, explicitly citing recent US actions in Venezuela as a cautionary signal. (Reuters)
So the posture is better described as opportunistic non-alignment: use the crisis to weaken the coalition opposing Russia in Europe, while keeping distance from a US move that could still harm Russian interests.
What this episode establishes
Russia’s Greenland stance is not a vote for US control. It is a calculated attempt to (a) discredit the security rationale, (b) widen cracks between Washington and European capitals, and (c) preserve freedom of manoeuvre in the Arctic while Russia’s strategic priority remains Ukraine. (Reuters)
References
Reuters (2026a) ‘Russia says the West should stop claiming Moscow wants to occupy Greenland’, 15 January. (Reuters)
Reuters (2026b) ‘Russia gleeful at Trump-Europe split over Greenland, but also has concerns’, 19 January. (Reuters)