Journal entry, 19 January 2026 (London)
What stands out tonight is not a surge of counter-statements from across the world, but the absence of them. Beyond Europe—and beyond the direct Russia/China rebuttals—the Greenland dispute is being treated by most capitals as a transatlantic quarrel with high downside and limited immediate benefit in taking a public position.
1) A crisis that is loud in Europe, quieter elsewhere
The dispute is structurally European-facing: the threatened tariffs are directed at eight European states and the sovereignty question concerns a Danish autonomous territory. Unsurprisingly, most reporting is dominated by European reactions (joint statements, EU instruments, emergency coordination) rather than a wider coalition forming around either side. (Reuters)
That asymmetry matters. It signals that, for many non-European states, the rational posture is avoid entanglement, keep bilateral channels with Washington open, and let Europeans carry the visible diplomatic burden.
2) G7 dynamics: Europe speaks; the G7 does not (as a bloc)
Inside the G7, the public pushback is clearest from European leaders—particularly France—who have framed tariff threats tied to territorial sovereignty as unacceptable coercion. Reuters reported President Macron explicitly rejecting “bullying” logic and describing tariff leverage over sovereignty as “fundamentally unacceptable.” (Reuters)
However, as of 19 January, the G7 as a grouping has not emerged as an operational venue for collective response. That is not surprising: the United States is itself a member, and the dispute is defined by a US ultimatum directed at allied states. In practice, coordination has been channelled through EU/NATO mechanisms, not the G7 brand. (Reuters)
3) BRICS and the “non-position”: national rebuttals, not bloc politics
On the BRICS side, the visible reactions have come nationally, not as a bloc communiqué.
- China has rejected the “China threat” justification directly, urging the United States not to use other countries as an excuse to pursue its own interests and framing Arctic issues as affecting the “international community” more broadly. (Reuters)
- Russia has insisted that claims about Russian (and Chinese) intent to occupy Greenland are baseless, treating the narrative as an example of Western “double standards.” (Reuters)
Beyond those national interventions, I have not found (in major outlets) any BRICS joint statement on Greenland by this date; the pattern appears to be that BRICS members prefer to let the episode play out as a NATO/EU–US issue while benefiting indirectly from Western friction. (Reuters)
4) Indo-Pacific allies: why silence is rational
For major US partners in the Indo-Pacific (Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan), there is a clear incentive to avoid public alignment in an Arctic sovereignty confrontation that:
- is not central to their regional threat perceptions, and
- risks creating unnecessary friction with Washington at a time when they remain focused on Indo-Pacific deterrence and trade stability.
This is “silence as statecraft”: not approval of coercion, but refusal to be recruited into a dispute where their interests are marginal and the reputational risk of choosing sides is high.
5) Markets speak when governments do not
Even where foreign ministries stay quiet, markets have treated the dispute as globally relevant because it resurrects broad trade-war uncertainty. Reuters reported investors moving into safe assets as the Greenland-linked tariff threats rattled currencies and risk appetite. (Reuters)
In effect, the rest of the world is “involved” through second-order exposure—confidence, risk pricing, and trade-route expectations—without taking explicit diplomatic positions.
What this episode establishes
The Greenland dispute has produced a telling global pattern:
- Europe speaks loudly because it is directly targeted and institutionally equipped (EU/NATO) to respond. (Al Jazeera)
- Russia and China speak selectively to reject being used as the security rationale, while enjoying the strategic discomfort it creates. (Reuters)
- Most other states practise disciplined silence, treating the crisis as a transatlantic problem—while markets price it as a global risk. (Reuters)
This is not global endorsement of the US position. It is a global preference to avoid being pulled into a confrontation that could escalate into trade retaliation or alliance instability.
References
Al Jazeera (2026) ‘European leaders slam Trump’s tariff threats over Greenland’, 19 January. (Al Jazeera)
Reuters (2026a) ‘Trump vows tariffs on eight European nations over Greenland’, 17 January. (Reuters)
Reuters (2026b) ‘Investors sell dollar, seek safety as Trump threatens Greenland tariffs’, 19 January. (Reuters)
Reuters (2026c) ‘After Trump salvo, Macron says: we don’t give in to bullies’, 20 January. (Reuters)
Reuters (2026d) ‘Russia says the West should stop claiming Moscow wants to occupy Greenland’, 15 January. (Reuters)
Reuters Video (2026) ‘China hits back at Trump’s Greenland remark, defends Arctic operations’, 12 January. (Reuters)
Reuters (2026e) ‘World markets face fresh jolt as Trump vows tariffs on Europe over Greenland’, 18–19 January. (Reuters)